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RECENT CASES.
Right to Follow Trust Funds- Does a Bank of Collection Become
Trustee of Proceeds Collected 7-Rights of Owner Against Receiver.-
Bank v. Austin, Receiver, 48 Fed. Rep. 25. Complainant bank
sent certain drafts for collection to defendant bank. Drafts of the
defendant bank for the amount on New York bankers were pro-
tested and unpaid. Complainant's demand for payment was then
refused by defendant bank. Four days afterward the defendant
bank failed. There was no evidence by which the specific funds
collected could be traced into the receiver's hands; on the contrary
the defendant bank, had after the date of collection proceeded to
cash checks and make usual payments until date of failure, from
the general fund, with which, it was alleged that the proceeds of
the drafts had been hopelessly mingled. The theory of the com-
plainant's claim was, "that the relation of the complainant to the
defendant bank was not that of debtor and creditor, nor that even
of a bank and its depositor, but that there was a trust relation
existing between them," and that the amount of its claim consti-
tuted " a first lien on all the assets in the hands of the receiver
superior to that of the general creditors of the bank," and claimed
that the general rule that trust funds cannot be followed when they
cannot be clearly distinguished from other property held by trustee
had been modified by the position of the U. S. S. C. in Nat. Bank
v. Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54. " Equity will follow the money even if
put into a bag, or an undistinguishable mass by taking out the
same quantity," and mainly also by the statement of the same court
in Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 693: "Finally, however, it has
been held as the better doctrine that confusion does not destroy
the equity entirely, but converts it into a charge upon the entire
mass, giving to the party injured by the unlawful conversion a
priority of right over the other creditors of the possessor." The
court held that the specific funds must be traced into the receiver's
hand, and in dismissing the bill, said: "This is not a case for the
application of the rule invoked here by the complainant. To
recur to the illustration of the trust-estate being in the bag, and
that a court of equity will put its hand into the bag, and take out
the same quantity as that which, by a misapplication, the trustee
put in. The bag is not shown to have been closed and inviolate,
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but it appears that the money was going out as fast as it was put
in, and the collection of complainant's bills did not in fact increase
the general assets of the bank, but, rather, that they were part
and parcel of the funds which were lost in the wreck of the baiik.
In the case of Railroad Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 577, 10 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 393, the court says, quoting with approval: ' A banker who
is, to his own knowledge, hopelessly insolvent, cannot honestly
continue his business, and receive the money of his customers,
and, although having no actual intent to cheat and defraud a par-
ticular customer, he will be held to have intended the inevitable
consequences of his own act to cheat and defraud all persons
whose money he receives, and whom he fails to pay, before he is
compelled to stop business.' In the light of this authority, the
offcer responsible for continuing the business of this bank after
hopeless insolvency had supervened, which must have been known
at least to the president of the bank, was committing a fraud in
receiving the money of innocent depositors and others ignorant of
its true condition. The complainant bank was the victim of this
fraud, as well as others, who had all been alike misled and
deceived by the apparent solvency and good credit of the bank.
But, in a legal or moral point of view, was the fraud any deeper
or more flagrant upon the complainant than upon the other cred-
itors of the bank ?" It is insisted that the relation of the complain-
ant and defendant bank was that of principal and agent; that the
complainant bank, by its instructions to collect and remit, never
agreed, by any implication, to stand on any other than a strictly
fiduciary relation; and that such relation is a different one, and
one of higher trust, so to speak, than the relation of a depositor or
other debtor of the bank. We have seen that the authorities do
not sustain this distinction as a ground for a preference in the dis-
tribution of the general assets of a broken bank; and, upon prin-
ciple, can such a preference be maintained? It is common, every-
day business for banks to employ each other as collection agencies;
and they perform this duty in no exceptional way, but in the same
manner in which they do the general business of the bank. A
bill is collected by a bank, and the proceeds mingled with the
general assets, so as to be entirely undistinguishable, and with no
ear-marks or means by which it can be identified or traced into
any new investment. The bank breaks. Now, on what principle
does he stand on other or higher ground than he who, with faith
in the solvency of the bank, deposits his money and loses it?
The contention here is not supported either by sound reason or
authority."
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Equitable Ass(gnment.-The case of McDaniel v. MAaxwell et al.,.
27 Pac. Rep. 952, contains a careful discussion by the Supreme Court
of Oregon of the questions of equitable assignment and the liability
of a garnishee. The facts in the case are briefly these : Maxwell, a
street contractor in the city of Portland, executed and delivered
to the Commercial National Bank an order on the city auditor
directing him to deliver to said bank any and all warrants drawn
in his favor on account of street work and authorizing the bank to
receipt for and endorse the warrants in his name. Before the
bank received any warrants from the city, Maxwell for valuable
consideration gave several orders on the fund. These orders were
presented to the bank and by it placed on file under a parol agree-
ment between payees, Maxwell and the bank, that bank after
reimbursing itself for advances made to Maxwell out of proceeds
of said warrants when collected, should apply the remainder of
proceeds to pay the orders. The bank received the warrants but
before any appropriation of the proceeds was made it was served
with garnishee process in action of McDaniel v. Mfaxwell. In the
opinion of the court, Bean, J., examines the question whether these
orders operated as an assignmentpro tanto of the fund to be col-
lected by the bank on warrants assigned to it by Maxwell and
after discussing assignment in law and equity says: "We think
the better rule is that an assignment of a part of an entire demand
is good in equity, and the debtor is bound, after notice of the
assignment, to so apply the fund ; and that an order drawn upon
a third person for a valuable consideration from the payee, paya-
ble out of a designated fund, then due or to become due, operates,
when delivered to the payee, as an equitable assignment or appro-
priation of the fund pro tanto, and no acceptance by the drawee is
necessary. * * By such an assignment the assignee obtains an
interest in the property or fund, and not simply a right of action
against the drawee. In order, therefore, that there may be an
equitable assignment creating an equitable property, there must
be a specific fund, sum of money, or debt, actually existing or to
become due in the future, and the order must be, in effect, an
assignment of that particular fund or some designated portion
thereof. No particular form of words or particular form of
instrument is necessary to effect such assignment. Any binding
appropriation of it to a particular use is an assignment, or transfer
of ownership." - And in considering whether the facts of this case
show such an appropriation from a particular fund the Court says
that while it may well be doubted whether the orders given suffi-
ciently specify the particular fund out of which they were to be
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paid to operate as an assignment, yet the subsequent agreement
between payees, Maxwell and the bank, leaves no doubt as to the
fund intended. "When, as in this case, the debt is not evidenced
by a writing, it may, by assent of debtor, be assigned even by a
verbal agreement, and. when such assent is given, the assignment
is complete. The fact that the orders in this case are in writing
did not prevent the parties from afterwards agreeing upon some
particular funds out of which they should be paid, and when such
fund was designated, the orders, together with such subsequent
agreement, operated as an equitable assignment or appropriation
pro tanto of such specified fund.
When are Money Demands of Several Complainants in a Single Suit
Se.parate and Distinct?-Bank v. Livermore, 48 Fed. Rep. 621. A
national bank brought a bill in behalf of itself and its stockholders
to enjoin the collection of taxes levied upon its capital stock and
upon the shares of its stockholders. The tax upon the bank's
capital stock amounted to less than $2,ooo, and the tax upon no
one of the shareholders reached the same amount. The principal
question was : Could the complainant bank add together the sev-
eral amounts in dispute so as to pass the jurisdictional limit of
$2,000, when it had failed to aver that it had dividends of
the stockholders under its control from which their taxes could
have been paid? The court held the money interest of the
stockholders and the complainant bank separate and distinct
and, upon the main point, said: "The rule deducible from
authorities is, that jurisdiction is not conferred because a number
of persons are interested in a given question, and the aggregate
of the several claims may exceed the amount requisite for juris-
diction. The ' matter in dispute,' within the meaning of the stat-
ute, is not the principle or rule of decision which is involved in
the controversy, and which may be common to the interests of all
the parties to the litigation, but it is the money value which is at
stake; and the claims of the several parties cannot be added
together to form the matter in dispute, unless each party has an
undivided interest in a claim to the property that is the subject of
the litigation. In the case now before the court the bank and its
shareholders are all interested in the questions involved in the
legal proposition touching the validity or invalidity of the mode of
assessment pursued, but the money interest they have in the liti-
gation is separate and distinct. The tax assessed against the
bank is separate and distinct from that assessed against the share-
holders, and the tax assessed against one shareholder cannot be
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collected from another. If the tax collector should undertake to
enforce the payment of the taxes complained of, he would proceed
against the property of each shareholder separately for the tax
due from him alone. The bank and each one of the shareholders
could have commenced a separate action to restrain the collection
of the tax assessed against each one, and in such case neither of
the complainants would have had any money interest in the cases
brought on behalf of the other shareholders. As the case now
stands, the bank aad its shareholders are interested alike in the
legal propositions arising on the record, but there is no common
or undivided interest in any property, nor in any fund, nor in a
tax assessed in a lump against property owned in common. The
assessment and tax is against each one separately, and the money
interest each- one has in the litigation is measured by the amount
of the tax assessed against him individually. That is the extent
of the money interest each one has in the suit, and the case, there-
fore, is one wherein for convenience' sake, and to save cost and
expense, one suit may be brought to settle the rights of all ; but
the money claims involved are separate and distinct, and the
amount thereof cannot be added together for the purpose of con-
ferring jurisdiction upon this court."
Inter-State Comimerce - Taxation of Railroads.- In State of Mfaine
v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., I2 Sup. Ct. Rep. r21, decided Decem-
ber 14, i891, the court deals with the right of a State to tax a
railroad upon its receipts from a point of view not hitherto con-
sidered. The question arose as to the constitutionality of a statute
imposing a tax upon railroads based upon the amount of their
receots during the preceding year. The objection was made that
this was a tax upon receipts and hence an interference with inter-
State commerce, but the court through Mr. Justice Field held
that it was simply an excise tax for the privilege of exercising the
franchises granted by the State, and that a tax of this character is
clearly within the power of the State to levy. A rather fine dis-
tinction is made in discussing the nature of this tax, as follows:
"The court below held that the imposition of the taxes was a
regulation of commerce, inter-State and foreign, and therefore in
conflict with the exclusive power of Congress in that respect; and
on that ground alone it ordered judgment for the defendant. This
ruling was founded upon the assumption that a reference by the
statute to the transportation receipts, and to a certain percentage
of the same, in determining the amount of the excise tax, was
in effect the imposition of the tax upon such receipts, and there-
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fore an interference with inter-State and foreign commerce. But
a resort to those receipts was simply to ascertain the value of the
business done by the corporation, and thus obtain a guide to a
reasonable conclusion as to the amount of the excise tax which
should be levied; and we are unable to perceive in that resort any
interference with transportation, domestic or foreign, over the
road of the railroad company, or any regulation of commerce
which consists in such transportation. If the amount ascertained
were specifically imposed as the tax, no objection to its validity
would be pretended. And if the inquiry of the State as to the
value of the privilege were limited to receipts of certain past years,
instead of the year in which the tax is collected, it is conceded
that the validity of the tax would not be affected; and if not, we
do not see how a reference to the results of any other year could
affect its character. There is no levy by the statute on the
receipts themselves, either in form or fact. They constitute, as
said above, simply the means of ascertaining the value of the
privilege conferred." Four of the justices dissented, refusing to,
recognize this distinction.
Rezward Offered by City-Personal Liability of Mayor.-Zinken v.
Talmadge, 22 Ati. Rep. 996 (N. J.) A mayor offered a reward
for the apprehension of a fugitive officer and in default of pay-
ment by the city action was brought to hold him personally respon-
sible. The decision of this question involves the consideration of
the general liability of public agents for acts apparently, but not
literally, within the scope of their authority and a comparison with
the well settled rules as to the responsibility of private agents.
"There is a well defined distinction between the contracts entered
into by private agents and those contracts made by public agents
in respect to their personal responsibility. Where a private agent
does not attempt to bind his principal, and in terms imposes the
obligation upon himself, the rule is, that he incurs by such act a
personal liability, although he describes himself as agent. *
But this is not the rule where the obligation is the same, but
the agent is acting within the scope of his authority as a public
agent. * * * A public agent, whenever the contract
is within the officer's power and duty, is not personally bound,
unless a contrary intention is plainly indicated by the terms and
circumstances of the transaction. The presumption is that he is
acting in his official capacity, and that the engagement is meant
to be with the public only." As it appeared, however .that his
action was outside the scope of his authority to bind the city, the
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presumption was rebutted, and it only remained to determine
whether he could still be held. A private agent who has exceeded
his authority, or who, having no responsible principal, has con-
tracted in his character as agent, is personally responsible. There
is a difference of opinion in different courts as to whether this rule
applies to public agents. The New Jersey courts have formerly
applied it to them, and it was held in this case that, as the mayor
exceeded his authority in making the contract, he was personally
liable for the consequences of its performances.
Action by Mrinor- Settlement by Nrext Friend.- Tripp v. Gifford,
29 N. B. Rep. 208. In this case the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts has considered the question of the effect upon an infant
of a compromise by next friend out of court. As to the general
powers of the next friend it is held he is an officer of the court
appointed specially for the protection of the infant's interests, and
he is not for any purpose a party to the suit, (R. R. v. Fitzpatrick,
36 Md. 619) ; he cannot submit the case to arbitration, .(Tucker v.
JDabbs, 12 Heisk, x8); he cannot compromise the suit without
express sanction of court, (Crotty v. Eagle, W. V., 13 S. PE. Rep.
59 ; Clark v. Crout, S. Car., 13 S. E. Rep. 602) ; he may however
assent to arrangements which will facilitate a determination of
the cause, (Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650); but the rights of
the infant will be sedulously protected both by courts of law and
of equity (Denholm v. McKay, 148 Mass. 434). In this case the
father acting as next friend had settled the case out of court, but
was afterwards removed by the court and upon subsequent trial
the defendant offered evidence of the settlement in bar of the
action. The evidence was excluded and this the Supreme Court
sustains, holding that when a next friend "assumes to settle out of
court and to finally discharge the cause of action, he clearly does
more than is within his power" as an officer of the court appointed
to prosecute the action. "He must act fairly and intelligently
for the real interest of the infant" and though it may well be con-
sidered his duty to negotiate a fair adjustment without subjecting
the plaintiff to the expense and risk of a trial, yet unless "such
attempted settlement is affirmed either in terms or by an entry of
judgment in regular course, it may well be held invalid" and the
infant will not be precluded upon the trial.
.Federal Jurisdiction - Mfunicilal Powers and Rights.- In New
Orleans v. N. 0. Water- Works Co. et al., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 142,
decided in December, i891, the important question of the juris-
diction of the Federal Courts over municipal corporations was
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considered. The court decided, Justice Harlan dissenting,
that municipal corporations, with all their rights and powers, are
creations of State legislation, and they are not protected by that
clause of the constitution which forbids the enactment of any law
which impairs the obligation of contracts. Neither can any limi-
tation or withdrawal by the legislature of the municipality's power
to tax be set aside by, or submitted to the jurisdiction of, the
Supreme Court, on the ground that it is taking property without
due process of law. The legislature has plenary power over the
municipality, even as to contracts previously passed upon by the
State Supreme Court. After citing several precedents, including
the Dartmouth College case, the opinion proceeds: "But further
citations of authorities upon this point are unnecessary. They
are full and conclusive to the point that the municipality, being a
mere agent of the State, stands in its govermental or public char-
acter in no contract relation with its sovereign, at whose pleasure
its charter may be amended, changed, or revoked, without the
impairment of any constitutional obligation, while with respect to
its private or proprietary rights and interests it may be entitled to
the constitutional protection. In this case the city has no more
right to claim an immunity for its contract with the water-works
company, than it would have had if such contract had been made
directly with the State. The State, having authorized such con-
tract, might revoke or modify it at its pleasure."
Sti~pulations in Telegraph Blanks-Right to Bring Suit- Parties.
- In Sherill v. West. Un. Tel. Co., x4 S. E. Rep. 94 (N. Car.), a
message was written on a telegraph blank containing the follow-
ing stipulation: "The company will not be liable for damages in
any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty
days after sending the message." The court said that this would
ordinarily be a reasonable requirement; but circumstances might
make it unreasonable, as where the message was never delivered,
which was the fact in this case. The court said: "The plaintiff
has made no demand before suit brought, but the general rule
that the commencement of an action is equivalent to a demand
applies to cases of this kind (Thomp. Elec. § 256). If, therefore,
the action was begun within sixty days after knowledge by the
plaintiff of the failure to deliver the message, it would be such
conipliance with the stipulation as could be required in a case
where a message was not delivered at all. If not brought within
such time, the plaintiff is barred by his own negligence in not
presenting his claim within the specified time." The message
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was sent by the plaintiff's sister to his father, at whose house he
was staying, telling of the illness of the plaintiff's daughter, "for
the use and benefit of the plaintiff," and prepaid out of his funds.
The court said: "The plaintiff could therefore maintain the
action, both because the sister was his agent for the purpose of
sending the telegram, and also because the plaintiff was the bene-
ficial party in the contemplation of the contract of sending the
message, since it was on its face sehat for his benefit, and he was
the party who alone would be injured by its negligent delay or
non-delivery."
Extradition - Trial for a .Diferent Offence. - In Ex parte
Mcnight, 28 N. E. Rep. 1034, the Supreme Court of Ohio has
held that a person surrendered to the authorities of a State from
another State on extradition proceedings, cannot, while held in
custody thereunder, be lawfully tried for any other crime thau
that upon which his extradition was obtained, unless he volunta-
rily waives his privilege. There are many conflicting decisions
upon this subject. both as to international and inter-State extradi-
tion, but as regards the former, State v. Vanderpool, 39 0. St. 273,
and U. S. v. Rauscher, i 19 U. S. 407, hold that under the Ashbur-
ton treaty, although the treaty itself is silent upon the question, one
cannot be so tried. In State v. Stewart, 6o Wis. 587, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin while recognizing the soundness of these
decisions, holds that they are not applicable to cases of inter-State
extradition. This, however, the Ohio court denies; the right
itself exists solely by virtue of the provisions in the federal consti-
tution, without which no State would be under any obligation to
surrender to another any person within its borders. Sec. 5278 of
the Revised Statutes provides that a copy of the indictment found
must accompany the request for extradition, which would be useless
could the prisoner afterwards be tried on a totally different charge.
The court say that it is unreasonable to suppose any State would
pay any serious attention to a general representation that the
party was guilty of some violation of the laws of the State demand-
ing him, yet that is practically the present case. They therefore
hold that sound principle compels them to decide that the prisoner
could only be tried upon the specific charge upon which his extra-
dition was based.
.TAnuted Negligence 
-Zouisville N'. A. & C. R. R. v. Creek,' 29
N. E. Rep. 48 1 (Ind.) C. was riding in a buggy with her husband
across a railroad track and while so doing was killed by the negli-
gence of the defendant's servants. C.'s husband was guilty of
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contributory negligence, but C. had no control of her husband nor
of the horse and buggy. The defendant contended that the neg-
ligence of the husband should be imputed to the wife, but the
court held to the contrary. Knightstown v. Musgrove, 16 Ind.
124, laid down the principle that before the negligence of a third
party can be interposed to shield another whose neglect of duty
has caused an injury to one who was without personal fault, it
must appear that the person injured sustained such a relation to
the third party in respect to the matter then in progress, that in
contemplation of law the negligent act of the latter was, upon the
principles of agency or codperation in a joint enterprise, the act of
the person injured. The court says.that a husband and wife may
undoubtedly sustain such a relation to each other as the above in
a given case, but the marital relation is not sufficient in itself to
have such effect, and concludes by saying that, in its opinion,
"there would be no more reason or justice in a rule which, in
cases of this character, would inflict upon a wife the consequences
of the husband's negligence, solely because of that relationship,
than to hold her accountable at the bar of eternal justice for his
sins because she was his wife."
Inter-State Commerce - Constitutionality of State Zawvs. - Bagg v.
Wilmington, etc., R. Co., :14 S. E. Rep. 79, decided that See. 1967 of
the North Carolina Code, imposing a penalty for the detention of
freight more than five days after delivery for shipment without
the shipper's consent, was not unconstitutional as to freight to be
shipped beyond the limit of the State, inasmuch as the statute
expedited, rather than impeded, inter-State commerce. The
court said: "The enforcement of the penalty is at once a stimulus
and a compensation placed within the reach of everyone who con-
signs his freight to another State, and he may avail himself of- its
aid as an incentive to promptness, to the same extent as the local
shipper may do. In fact the controversy before us has its origin
in a failure to ship goods to another State, and we are asked
to declare the law invalid where its aid has been invoked to expe-
dite inter-State commerce and to thereby leave the defendant at
liberty to embarrass such traffic, not by legislation, but by inac-
tion or unfair conduct. * * * The palpable purpose
of the legislature in enacting our statute was to stimulate trade,
and develop the resources of its people. It throws the aegis of
State protection alike over freight consigned under the care of the
State and that of which the general government has the right of
supervision."
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Bail- -Right of Sureties to Arrest Prindzal in Another State.-
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State v. Lingerfelt, i4
S. E. Rep. 75, decided that the sureties on a bail bond given in
Tennessee had a right, in person or by agent, to arrest their
absconding principal in North Carolina. The court said, "It is
insisted that the ' bail only represents the court from which his
authority emanates, and, where the court has no power to arrest,
the bail has no power to arrest.' Such, indeed, is the language
of Mr. Wharton (3 Crim. Law, § 2976), but the only authority
he cites is from Canada, where it was held that the bail could
not follow his principal from New York, and arrest him in the
British dominions. This, it was said, would be dangerous to
the national independence of Canada. As between the States,
however, a different rule applies, and the distinction is sustained
by the highest authority." Quoting from Nicolls v. Ingersoll,
7 Johns. 145, the court said: "The bail-piece is not process,
nor anything in the nature of it, but is merely a record or
memorial of the delivery of the principal to his bail on security
given. It cannot be questioned but that bail in the common
pleas would have a right to go into any other county in the
State to take his principal. This shows that the jurisdiction of
the court in no way controls the authority of the bail, and as little
can the jurisdiction of the State affect this right as between the
bail and his principal."
Responsibility of Railroad Companies in Carrying LDogs.- Kansas
City, etc. R. Co. v. Higdon, io South. Rep. 282 (Ala.) was an
action against a railroad to recover damages for the loss of a dog.
The plaintiff boarded the defendant's train with his dog. The
conductor told him that he must put the dog in the baggage car,
which he did, leaving it in charge of the baggage-master. Arrived
at his destination, he demanded the dog of the baggage-master,
who refused to deliver it to him except on payment of twenty-five
cents. This the plaintiff declined to pay, and the dog was carried
on and lost. Neither the conductor nor the baggage-master had
told the plaintiff of a rule of the railroad prohibiting the carrying
of dogs, except so far as its employees choose to be personally
responsible for them, nor did the plaintiff know of this regulation.
The court said: "A rule of which the passenger has no notice
cannot have effect to relieve the railroad company of responsi-
bility for an article accepted for carriage by an employee who is
intrusted with the duty of receiving and taking charge of goods
delivered for transportation, and who accepts the article in ques-
tion apparently in the course of his employment and on behalf of
the principal "
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Accord and Satisfaction- Settlement for Nuisance by One of Several
Wrongders.- Gallagher v. .Kemmerer, 22 Ati. Rep. 970, was an
action to recover damages for injuries to plaintiff's land caused by
a deposit of mine water, culm and dirt. This land was situated
on a small stream and was covered with refuse from two coal
companies situated further up on the stream. Plaintiff for valu-
able consideration released one of said companies from all claims
and demands for damages and compensation for injuries then or
thereafter done to his property. This action was against the
other company for its proportion of the damage. Defendants,
claiming that it was occasioned by simultaneous and contempora-
neous acts, and consequently that it was impossible to ascertain
the proportion of damage caused by each, pleaded an accord and
satisfaction. The court held that, as the negligent act was
separate and independent of the acts of the other miners, it was
several when committed, and did not become joint because the
consequences were united. As the negligence of both was sepa-
rate, and there was no concert of action, an accord and satisfac-
tion by one was not compensation for the whole damage and was
no bar to recovery from the other.
Care of Parent by Child-NVo Promise of Payment for Such Ser-
vices Implied.-Wilks v. Cornelius, 28 Pac. Rep. 135 (Oregon.) A
son had put in a claim against the estate of his parent for board
and care and attention, and the claim was resisted by the executor.
The Court said: "The claim, as presented to the executor, is
based upon the rule that, where one person renders valuable ser-
vices for another, the law implies a promise on the part of the
party benefitted to pay so much as such services are reasonably
worth. This is the general rule. But, where the services are
rendered by one near relative to another, an exception to the rule
prevails, and no such promise is implied. In such case, before
the party rendering services can claim compensation from the
other, he must show an express agreement, or its equivalent, to
pay for the same. Where such services consist in furnishing
board and lodging to a parent by a child they are presumed to
have been done gratuitously, however valuable they may have
been, and such presumption can only be overcome by clear, direct
and positive proof of an understanding or agreement on the part
of the parent to pay, and of the child to receive, compensation
therefor. "
Right to Possession of Dead Body - Action for MAutilation - Dam -
ages.-In the case of Larson v. Chase, 50 N. W. Rep. 238, which
